Open Rule Legislative Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans
• 署名单位: Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag038
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: policy-making; equilibrium; MODEL; baron

摘要

The seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989, Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review, 83, 1181-1206) leaves significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. We aim to fill these gaps by providing a fresh analysis of open rule bargaining. Our approach relies on an appealing class of stationary equilibria. In this class, we show that delays tend to be longer and allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn. Our results shed new light on the efficiency and fairness implications of using an open vs. closed rule in legislatures and of bargaining processes in general.