-
作者：Delgado-Vega, Alvaro; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：University of Chicago; Johannes Kepler University Linz
摘要：A principal (such as a centrist political party) can partially influence the allocation of power between two competing parties. The principal is closer to one party, the Friend, than to the other, the Enemy. The principal's optimal contract initially seeks to exclude the Enemy. However, once the Enemy gains power, the principal embraces him in exchange for policy moderation. Moderation also disciplines the Friend, inducing him to move closer to the principal's preferred policy. Principals clos...
-
作者：Aneja, Abhay; Farina, Silvia; Xu, Guo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article combines personnel records of the U.S. government with census data to study how exposure to greater female representation at work can persistently reduce intergenerational gender gaps in labour market outcomes. Exploiting city-by-department variation in the sudden expansion of female employment during World War I, we find that daughters of civil servants exposed to female co-workers are more likely to work later in life. This intergenerational effect operates through exposed fathe...
-
作者：Jaakkola, Niko; Wagener, Florian
作者单位：University of Bologna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We analyse discontinuous Markovian strategies for differential games. The best response correspondence uniquely maps almost all profiles of opponents' strategies back to the strategy space. We thus make Markov-perfect equilibria in a wide class of differential games well-behaved, resolving a long-standing open problem. We provide a readily applicable necessary and sufficient condition for best responses and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. We demonstrate our methods in a canonical model of non-...
-
作者：Donna, Javier D.; Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio
作者单位：University of Miami; Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We investigate the efficiency of a market relative to a non-market institution-an auction relative to a quota-as allocation mechanisms in the presence of frictions. We use data from water markets in southeastern Spain and explore a specific change in the institutions to allocate water. On the one hand, frictions arose because poor farmers were liquidity constrained. On the other hand, farmers who were part of the wealthy elite were not liquidity constrained. We estimate a structural dynamic de...
-
作者：Athey, Susan; Chetty, Raj; Imbens, Guido W.; Kang, Hyunseung
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Stanford University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：A common challenge in estimating the impact of interventions (e.g. job training programmes, educational programmes) is that many outcomes of interest (e.g. lifetime earnings or other labour market outcomes) are observed with a long delay. In biomedical settings, this is often addressed by using short-term outcomes as so-called surrogates for the outcome of interest, e.g. tumour size as a surrogate for mortality in cancer studies. We build on this literature by combining multiple, possibly qual...
-
作者：Ederer, Florian; Pellegrino, Bruno
作者单位：Boston University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：We study the welfare implications of the rise of common ownership in the U.S. from 1995 to 2021. We build a general equilibrium model with a hedonic demand system in which firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Firms are connected through two large networks: the first reflects ownership overlap, the second product market rivalry. In our model, common ownership of competing firms induces unilateral incentives to soften competition and the magnitude of the common ownership effect depends ...
-
作者：Begenau, Juliane; Bigio, Saki; Majerovitz, Jeremy; Vieyra, Matias
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Notre Dame; Bank of Canada
摘要：Bank capital requirements are based on book values, which are slow to reflect losses. In this article, we develop a dynamic model of banks to study the interaction of regulation and delayed accounting. Our model explains four stylized facts: book and market values diverge during crises, the market-to-book ratio predicts future profitability, book leverage constraints rarely bind strictly even as market leverage fans out during crises, and banks delever gradually after net-worth shocks. We show...
-
作者：Pelican, Andrin; Graham, Bryan S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Consider a setting where N players, partitioned into K observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g. agents may have preferences over their network centrality) and a private, or dyadic, component which is additively separable in own links. This latter component allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the costs of sending and receiving links across agents (respectively out- and in- degree heterog...
-
作者：Chen, Zhao; Jiang, Xian; Liu, Zhikuo; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez; Xu, Daniel Yi
-
作者：Yang, Frank
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a one-dimensional productive component and a multidimensional costly component. Can the principal improve upon simple one-dimensional mechanisms by also using the costly instruments? We show that if the agent has preferences between the two components that are...
