Embracing the Enemy

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Delgado-Vega, Alvaro; Schneider, Johannes
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Johannes Kepler University Linz
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag090
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Relational contracts; DYNAMICS

摘要

A principal (such as a centrist political party) can partially influence the allocation of power between two competing parties. The principal is closer to one party, the Friend, than to the other, the Enemy. The principal's optimal contract initially seeks to exclude the Enemy. However, once the Enemy gains power, the principal embraces him in exchange for policy moderation. Moderation also disciplines the Friend, inducing him to move closer to the principal's preferred policy. Principals close to the Friend fully embrace the Enemy; more centrist principals divide their support. Commitment benefits the principal only if she is close to the Friend and parties value power little.