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作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n(i) action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind, which is non-deterministic. A limited forecast equilibrium is such that after every history the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct. The set of all limited forecast equilibria is characteri...
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作者：Cole, HL; Kehoe, TJ
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We characterize the values of government debt and the debt's maturity structure under which financial crises brought on by a loss of confidence in the government can arise within a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. We also characterize the optimal policy response of the government to the threat of such a crisis. We show that when the country's fundamentals place it inside the crisis zone, the government may be motivated to reduce its debt and exit the crisis zone because this lead...
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作者：Laitner, J
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper presents a model in which a country's measured average propensity to save endogenously rises when its economy industrializes. The model has agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Only agriculture uses land. If at early dates income per capita is low, agricultural consumption is important, land is valuable, and capital gains on land may constitute most wealth accumulation, leaving the country's NIPA APS low. If exogenous technological progress raises incomes over time, Engel's law s...
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作者：Segal, I
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The paper considers a hold-up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient, and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented. As the environment becomes more complex (n --> infinity), the outcome under any message-contingent long-term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post, but not ex ante. When trades are costly to describe, both ex ante and ex post, the incomplete contr...
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作者：Diebold, FX; Ohanian, LE; Berkowitz, J
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We propose a constructive, multivariate framework for assessing agreement between (generally misspecified) dynamic equilibrium models and data, which enables a complete second-order comparison of the dynamic properties of models and data. We use bootstrap algorithms to evaluate the significance of deviations between models and data, and we use goodness-of-fit criteria to produce estimators that optimize economically-relevant loss functions. We provide a detailed illustrative application to mod...
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作者：Heckman, JJ; Smith, J; Clements, N
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：The conventional approach to social programme evaluation focuses on estimating mean impacts of programmes. Yet many interesting questions regarding the political economy of programmes, the distribution of programme benefits and the option values conferred on programme participants require knowledge of the distribution of impacts, or features of it. This paper presents evidence that heterogeneity in response to programmes is empirically important and that classical probability inequalities are ...
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作者：Heckman, JJ; Ichimura, H; Todd, PE
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper considers whether it is possible to devise a nonexperimental procedure for evaluating a prototypical job training programme. Using rich nonexperimental data, we examine the performance of a two-stage evaluation methodology that (a) estimates the probability that a person participates in a programme and (b) uses the estimated probability in extensions of the classical method of matching. We decompose the conventional measure of programme evaluation bias into several components and fi...
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作者：Agastya, M
摘要：We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. Following this, we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide t...
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作者：Schmidt, KM
摘要：The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: It increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm's profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the total effect is ambiguous. I identify natural circumstances where increasing competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. In general, however, this relation need not be monotonic. A simple example de...
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作者：Stein, JC
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper develops a model of repeated innovation with knowledge spillovers. The model's novel feature is that firms compete on two dimensions: (1) product quality, where one firm's innovation ultimately spills over to other firms; and (2) distribution costs, where there are no spillovers across firms and where learning-by-doing on the part of incumbent firms gives them a competitive advantage over would-be entrants. Such firm-specific learning-by-doing has two important consequences: (1) it ...
