Adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agastya, M
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.2307/2971721
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 411-426
• 关键词: equilibrium; MODEL

摘要

We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. Following this, we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation, regardless of the initial history.