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作者：Au, Chun-Chung; Henderson, J. Vernon
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper models and estimates net urban agglomeration economies for cities. Economic models of cities postulate an inverted U shape of real income per worker against city employment, where the inverted U shifts with industrial composition across the urban hierarchy of cities. This relationship has never been estimated, in part because of data requirements. China has the necessary data and context. We find that urban agglomeration benefits are high-real incomes per worker rise sharply with in...
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作者：Elliott, Graham; Mueller, Ulrich K.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：There are a large number of tests for instability or breaks in coefficients in regression models designed for different possible departures from the stable model. We make two contributions to this literature. First, we consider a large class of persistent breaking processes that lead to asymptotically equivalent efficient tests. Our class allows for many or relatively few breaks, clustered breaks, regularly occurring breaks, or smooth transitions to changes in the regression coefficients. Thus...
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作者：Phelan, Christopher
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper argues that both unequal opportunity and social mobility are necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives must be provided.
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作者：Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier; Jeanne, Olivier
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Standard theoretical arguments tell us that countries with relatively little capital benefit from financial integration as foreign capital flows in and speeds up the process of convergence. We show in a calibrated neoclassical model that conventionally measured welfare gains from this type of convergence appear relatively limited for the typical emerging market country. The welfare gain from switching from financial autarky to perfect capital mobility is roughly equivalent to a 1% permanent in...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I estimate a model in which new technology entails random adjustment needs. Rapid adjustments may cause measured productivity to decline. The slow-downs persist because adjustment is costly, and hence protracted. The model explains both the steepness and the deepness asymmetry of cycles. Adjustment costs amount to about 14% of output and technological inefficiency to about 28%. Firms abandon technologies long before they are perfected-current practice total factor productivity (TFP) is 20% bel...
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作者：Foellmi, Reto; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an innovation-based growth model and study how income and wealth inequality affect economic growth. We identify a (positive) price effect-where increasing inequality allows innovators to charge higher prices and (negative) market-size effects-with higher inequality implying smaller markets for new goods and/or a slower transition of new goods into mass markets. It turns out that price effects dominate market-size effects. We also show that a redistr...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a random-matching model of the marriage market. Otherwise identical partners possess a pay-off-irrelevant characteristic, colour. We derive the set of colour-blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient. Equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match. It is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay-of...
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format ...
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作者：Lalive, Rafael; Van Ours, Jan; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance-the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD)-affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longe...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies.
