Monotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McAdams, David
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1039-1056
• 关键词: Existence; pure; single; games

摘要

In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies.