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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; New Economic School
摘要：We study the formation of a ruling coalition in non-democratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its s...
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作者：Blow, Laura; Browning, Martin; Crawford, Ian
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Characteristics models have been found to be useful in many areas of economics. However, their empirical implementation tends to rely heavily on functional form assumptions. In this paper we develop a revealed preference approach to characteristics models. We derive the necessary and sufficient empirical conditions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous, price-taking consumers are non-parametrically consistent with the consumer characteristics model. Where these conditions h...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Yeaple, Stephen
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop an assignment theory to analyse the volume and composition of foreign direct investment (FDI). Firms conduct FDI by either engaging in greenfield investment or in cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border acquisitions involve firms trading heterogeneous corporate assets to exploit complementarities, while greenfield FDI involves setting up a new production division in the foreign country. In equilibrium, greenfield FDI and cross-border acquisitions coexist within the same industry, bu...
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作者：Kuran, Timur; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：Duke University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms: behavioural adaptations driven by pay-offs to coordination, and preference changes shaped by socialization and self-persuasion. This paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously. It identifies a broad set of conditio...
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作者：Beckert, Walter; Blundell, Richard
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers structural non-parametric random utility models for continuous choice variables with unobserved heterogeneity. We provide sufficient conditions on random preferences to yield reduced-form systems of non-parametric stochastic demand functions that allow global invertibility between demands and non-separable unobserved heterogeneity. Invertibility is essential for global identification of structural consumer demand models, for the existence of well-specified probability mode...
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作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action. The weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed, as it is assumed. This paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model. We construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish, but pay a sw...
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作者：Bandi, F. M.; Russell, J. R.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：A recent and extensive literature has pioneered the summing of squared observed intra-daily returns, realized variance, to estimate the daily integrated variance of financial asset prices, a traditional object of economic interest. We show that, in the presence of market microstructure noise, realized variance does not identify the daily integrated variance of the frictionless equilibrium price. However, we demonstrate that the noise-induced bias at very high sampling frequencies can be approp...
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作者：Horner, Johannes; Jamison, Julian
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Southern California
摘要：We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The proprietary information is eventually revealed, and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players' pay-offs tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1. However, the...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterization of long-run play reveals the determinants of success; these include the correlation ...
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作者：Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry; Silverman, Dan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yale University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but may incorporate a possibility of unemployment.
