When does one bad apple spoil the barrel? An evolutionary analysis of collective action

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00482.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 499-527
• 关键词: private provision; public-goods; group heterogeneity; MODEL; PARTICIPATION; equilibria

摘要

This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterization of long-run play reveals the determinants of success; these include the correlation between players' costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors.