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作者：Quercioli, Elena; Smith, Lones
作者单位：Central Michigan University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high no...
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作者：Torgovitsky, Alexander
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I consider nonparametric identification of nonseparable instrumental variables models with continuous endogenous variables. If both the outcome and first stage equations are strictly increasing in a scalar unobservable, then many kinds of continuous, discrete, and even binary instruments can be used to point-identify the levels of the outcome equation. This contrasts sharply with related work by Imbens and Newey, 2009 that requires continuous instruments with large support. One implication is ...
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作者：Szabo, Andrea
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper analyzes South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy, under which households receive a free water allowance equal to the World Health Organization's recommended minimum. I estimate residential water demand, evaluate the welfare effects of free water, and provide optimal price schedules derived from a social planner's problem. I use a data set of monthly metered billing data for 60,000 households for 2002-2009 from a particularly disadvantaged suburb of Pretoria, with rich price variation...
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作者：Choo, Eugene
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：This paper develops a new model for empirically analyzing dynamic matching in the marriage market and then applies that model to recent changes in the U.S. marriage distribution. Its primary objective is to estimate gains by age from being married today (till death of at least one spouse) relative to remaining single for that same time period. An empirical methodology that relies on the model's equilibrium outcomes identifies the marriage gains using a single cross-section of observed aggregat...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Einav, Liran; Hansen, Lars Peter; Jackson, Matthew O.; Jehiel, Philippe; Sobel, Joel; Tamer, Elie
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University
摘要：This paper concerns the two-stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the Nash bargaining with endogenous threats solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two-person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problemati...
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作者：Bonhomme, Stephane; Manresa, Elena
作者单位：University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper introduces time-varying grouped patterns of heterogeneity in linear panel data models. A distinctive feature of our approach is that group membership is left unrestricted. We estimate the parameters of the model using a grouped fixed-effects estimator that minimizes a least squares criterion with respect to all possible groupings of the cross-sectional units. Recent advances in the clustering literature allow for fast and efficient computation. We provide conditions under which our ...
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作者：Francois, Patrick; Rainer, Ilia; Trebbi, Francesco
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Is African politics characterized by concentrated power in the hands of a narrow group (ethnically determined) that then fluctuates from one extreme to another via frequent coups? Employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence, we show that African ruling coalitions are surprisingly large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful min...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Strzalecki, Tomasz
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a preference for flexibility in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of choice aversion, where the agent prefers to remove items from a me...
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作者：Fujiwara, Thomas
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in Brazilian elections. Estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual (error-ridden and uncounted) votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens. Estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology's phase-in across states over time suggest that, as predicted by political economy models, it shifted government spending toward ...
