HOW IS POWER SHARED IN AFRICA?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Francois, Patrick; Rainer, Ilia; Trebbi, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11237
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 465-503
• 关键词: model; patronage; ETHNICITY; POLITICS

摘要

Is African politics characterized by concentrated power in the hands of a narrow group (ethnically determined) that then fluctuates from one extreme to another via frequent coups? Employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence, we show that African ruling coalitions are surprisingly large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful ministerial posts. We argue that the likelihood of revolutions from outsiders and coup threats from insiders are major forces explaining allocations within these regimes. Alternative allocation mechanisms are explored. Counterfactual experiments that shed light on the role of Western policies in affecting African national coalitions and leadership group premia are performed.