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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua D.; Narita, Yusuke; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University; Yale University
摘要：A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi-experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery-generated randomization integral to such ...
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作者：Graham, Bryan S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：I introduce a model of undirected dyadic link formation which allows for assortative matching on observed agent characteristics (homophily) as well as unrestricted agent-level heterogeneity in link surplus (degree heterogeneity). Like in fixed effects panel data analyses, the joint distribution of observed and unobserved agent-level characteristics is left unrestricted. Two estimators for the (common) homophily parameter, beta(0), are developed and their properties studied under an asymptotic ...
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作者：Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni
作者单位：University of Oslo; Statistics Norway
摘要：Differences in preferences are important to explain variation in individuals' behavior. There is, however, no consensus on how to take these differences into account when evaluating policies. While prominent in the economic literature, the standard utilitarian criterion is controversial. According to some, interpersonal comparability of utilities involves value judgments with little objective basis. Others argue that social justice is primarily about the distribution of commodities assigned to...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions ov...
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Stanford University; Boston University
摘要：We study a dynamic principal-agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the agent's private information. She may even achieve her first-best payoff in the long run. The relationship may also exhibit path dependence, with early shocks determining the principal's long-run value. These findings contrast sharply with the res...
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作者：Judd, Kenneth L.; Maliar, Lilia; Maliar, Serguei
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Universitat d'Alacant; Santa Clara University
摘要：We propose a novel methodology for evaluating the accuracy of numerical solutions to dynamic economic models. It consists in constructing a lower bound on the size of approximation errors. A small lower bound on errors is a necessary condition for accuracy: If a lower error bound is unacceptably large, then the actual approximation errors are even larger, and hence, the approximation is inaccurate. Our lower-bound error analysis is complementary to the conventional upper-error (worst-case) bou...
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作者：Daskalakis, Constantinos; Deckelbaum, Alan; Tzamos, Christos
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening severa...
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作者：Chetverikov, Denis; Wilhelm, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; University College London
摘要：The ill-posedness of the nonparametric instrumental variable (NPIV) model leads to estimators that may suffer from poor statistical performance. In this paper, we explore the possibility of imposing shape restrictions to improve the performance of the NPIV estimators. We assume that the function to be estimated is monotone and consider a sieve estimator that enforces this monotonicity constraint. We define a constrained measure of ill-posedness that is relevant for the constrained estimator an...
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作者：Mele, Angelo
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper proposes an empirical model of network formation, combining strategic and random networks features. Payoffs depend on direct links, but also link externalities. Players meet sequentially at random, myopically updating their links. Under mild assumptions, the network formation process is a potential game and converges to an exponential random graph model (ERGM), generating directed dense networks. I provide new identification results for ERGMs in large networks: if link externalities...
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作者：Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Georgetown University; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations, and the interaction of those aspirations with growth and inequality. The interaction is bidirectional: economy-wide outcomes determine individual aspirations, which in turn determine investment incentives and social outcomes. Thus aspirations, income, and the distribution of income evolve jointly. When capital stocks lie in some compact set, steady state distributions must exhibit inequality and are typically clustered around loc...
