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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.; Lu, Jay
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We propose a novel model of stochastic choice: the single-crossing random utility model (SCRUM). This is a random utility model in which the collection of preferences satisfies the single-crossing property. We offer a characterization of SCRUMs based on two easy-to-check properties: the classic Monotonicity property and a novel condition, Centrality. The identified collection of preferences and associated probabilities is unique. We show that SCRUMs nest both single-peaked and single-dipped ra...
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作者：Arellano, Manuel; Blundell, Richard; Bonhomme, Stephane
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Chicago
摘要：We develop a new quantile-based panel data framework to study the nature of income persistence and the transmission of income shocks to consumption. Log-earnings are the sum of a general Markovian persistent component and a transitory innovation. The persistence of past shocks to earnings is allowed to vary according to the size and sign of the current shock. Consumption is modeled as an age-dependent nonlinear function of assets, unobservable tastes, and the two earnings components. We establ...
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作者：Bourles, Renaud; Bramoulle, Yann; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We provide the first analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about the well-being of their network neighbors. Depending on incomes, they may provide financial support to their poorer friends. We study the Nash equilibria of the resulting game of transfers. We show that equilibria maximize a concave potential function. We establish existence, uniqueness of equilibrium consumption, and generic uniqueness of equilibrium transfers. We characterize the geom...
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作者：Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive (pure) bundling in an oligopoly market. We find that under fairly general conditions, relative to separate sales, bundling raises market prices, benefits firms, and harms consumers when the number of firms is above a threshold (which can be small). This is in contrast to the findings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses. Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion affects price com...
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作者：Freyberger, Joachim
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper provides positive testability results for the identification condition in a nonparametric instrumental variable model, known as completeness, and it links the outcome of the test to properties of an estimator of the structural function. In particular, I show that the data can provide empirical evidence in favor of both an arbitrarily small identified set as well as an arbitrarily small asymptotic bias of the estimator. This is the case for a large class of complete distributions as ...
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作者：Konig, Michael D.; Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Lausanne; Yale University
摘要：We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed-form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances an...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Smith, Lones; Park, Andreas
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：We develop a continuum player timing game that subsumes standard wars of attrition and pre-emption games, and introduces a new rushes phenomenon. Payoffs are continuous and single-peaked functions of the stopping time and stopping quantile. We show that if payoffs are hump-shaped in the quantile, then a sudden rush of players stops in any Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium.Fear relaxes the first mover advantage in pre-emption games, asking that the least quantile beat the average; greed relax...
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作者：Canay, Ivan A.; Romano, Joseph P.; Shaikh, Azeem M.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper develops a theory of randomization tests under an approximate symmetry assumption. Randomization tests provide a general means of constructing tests that control size in finite samples whenever the distribution of the observed data exhibits symmetry under the null hypothesis. Here, by exhibits symmetry we mean that the distribution remains invariant under a group of transformations. In this paper, we provide conditions under which the same construction can be used to construct tests...
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作者：Hirano, Keisuke; Wright, Jonathan H.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We consider forecasting with uncertainty about the choice of predictor variables. The researcher wants to select a model, estimate the parameters, and use the parameter estimates for forecasting. We investigate the distributional properties of a number of different schemes for model choice and parameter estimation, including: in-sample model selection using the Akaike information criterion; out-of-sample model selection; and splitting the data into subsamples for model selection and parameter ...
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作者：Gousse, Marion; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Robin, Jean-Marc
作者单位：Laval University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of London; University College London
摘要：We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991-2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, educ...
