FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH GENERAL INFORMATION STRUCTURES: IMPLICATIONS FOR BIDDING AND REVENUE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
署名单位：
Yale University; University of Chicago; Princeton University
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA13958
发表日期：
2017
页码：
107-143
关键词：
摘要：
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative auction mechanisms.