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作者：Akbarpour, Mohammad; Kominers, Scott Duke; Li, Kevin Michael; Li, Shengwu; Milgrom, Paul
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University; Stanford University; Harvard University
摘要：We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee nothing when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm's allocative and investment guarantees coincide if and only if its confirming negative externalities are sufficiently small. We introduce fast approximation algorithms for the knapsack problem that...
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作者：Beaman, Lori; Karlan, Dean; Thuysbaert, Bram; Udry, Christopher
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use a two-stage experiment on agricultural lending in Mali to test whether selection into lending is predictive of heterogeneous returns to capital. Understanding this heterogeneity, and the selection process which reveals it, is critical for guiding modeling of credit markets in developing countries, as well as for policy. We find such heterogeneity: returns to capital are higher for farmers who borrow than for those who do not. In our first stage, we offer loans in some villages and not o...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study how discounting and monitoring jointly determine whether cooperation is possible in repeated games with imperfect (public or private) monitoring. Our main result provides a simple bound on the strength of players' incentives as a function of discounting, monitoring precision, and on-path payoff variance. We show that the bound is tight in the low-discounting/low-monitoring double limit, by establishing a public-monitoring folk theorem where the discount factor and the monitoring struc...
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作者：Cullen, Zoe B.; Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Brown University
摘要：The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly rene...
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作者：Chikis, Craig A.; Goldberg, Jonathan; Lopez-Salido, David
作者单位：University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Using an endogenous growth model, Liu, Mian, and Sufi (2022) (LMS) show that a decline in the interest rate can lead to a fall in productivity growth and a rise in leader-laggard productivity gaps and firm profits. We identify two issues in their quantitative analysis of transition dynamics: a time-scale error and the omission of composition terms in calculating productivity growth along the transition to a new balanced growth path. Correcting the time-scale error and including the composition...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
作者单位：University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper shows that there is more scope for a borrower to engage in a sustainable infinite debt rollover (a Ponzi scheme) when interest/growth rates are stochastic. In this context, I prove that the relevant r vs. g comparison uses the yield rlong to an infinite-maturity zero-coupon bond. I show that rlong is lower than the risk-neutral expectation of the short-term yield when it is variable, and that rlong is close to the minimal realization of the short-term yield when it is highly persist...
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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; Grant, Simon; Yang, Jingni
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Australian National University
摘要：Gul and Pesendorfer (2015) propose a promising theory of decision under uncertainty, they dub Hurwicz expected utility (HEU). HEU is a special case of & alpha;-maxmin EU that allows for preferences over sources of uncertainty. It is consistent with most of the available empirical evidence on decision under risk and uncertainty. We show that HEU is also tractable and can readily be measured and tested. We do this by deriving a new two-parameter functional form for the probability weighting func...
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作者：Bierbrauer, Felix J. J.; Boyer, Pierre C. C.; Hansen, Emanuel
作者单位：University of Cologne; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; University of Munich
摘要：We develop a new approach for the identification of Pareto-improving tax reforms. This approach yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto-improving reform directions. A main insight is that Two brackets are enough: When the system cannot be improved by altering tax rates in one or two income brackets, then there is no continuous reform direction that is Pareto-improving. We also show how to check whether a given tax reform is Pareto-improving. We use these tools to...
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作者：Gonzales, Luis E.; Ito, Koichiro; Reguant, Mar
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Northwestern University
摘要：We study the investment effects of market integration on renewable energy expansion. Our theory highlights that market integration not only improves allocative efficiency by gains from trade but also incentivizes new investment in renewable power plants. To test our theoretical predictions, we examine how recent grid expansions in the Chilean electricity market changed electricity production, wholesale prices, generation costs, and renewable investments. We then build a structural model of pow...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Kartik, Navin; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Columbia University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are patient, there can be equilibria with Coasian dynamics: the veto player's private information can largely nullify proposer's bargaining power. Our main result, however, is that under some conditions there also are equilibria in which the proposer obtains the h...
