Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20206
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1727-1761
• 关键词: Moral hazard; COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION; players; payoffs

摘要

We study how discounting and monitoring jointly determine whether cooperation is possible in repeated games with imperfect (public or private) monitoring. Our main result provides a simple bound on the strength of players' incentives as a function of discounting, monitoring precision, and on-path payoff variance. We show that the bound is tight in the low-discounting/low-monitoring double limit, by establishing a public-monitoring folk theorem where the discount factor and the monitoring structure can vary simultaneously.