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作者：Dizon-Ross, Rebecca
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Schools worldwide distribute information to parents about their children's academic performance. Do frictions prevent parents, particularly low-income parents, from accessing this information to make decisions? A field experiment in Malawi shows that, at baseline, parents' beliefs about their children's academic performance are often inaccurate. Providing parents with clear, digestible performance information causes them to update their beliefs and adjust their investments: they increase the s...
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作者：Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Salz, Tobias
作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. to assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative ...
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作者：Malenko, Andrey; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In many cases, buyers are not informed about their valuations and rely on experts, who are informed but biased for overbidding. We study auction design when selling to such advised buyers. We show that a canonical dynamic auction, the English auction, has a natural equilibrium that outperforms standard static auctions in expected revenues and allocative efficiency. The ability to Communicate as the auction proceeds allows for more informative communication and gives advisors the ability to per...
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作者：Lustig, Hanno; Stathopoulos, Andreas; Verdelhan, Adrien
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Fixing the investment horizon, the returns to currency carry trades decrease as the maturity of the foreign bonds increases. Across developed countries, the local currency term premia, which increase with the maturity of the bonds, offset the currency risk premia. Similarly, in the time-series, the predictability of foreign bond returns in dollars declines with the bonds' maturities. Leading no-arbitrage models in international finance do not match the downward term structure of currency carry...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Bisin, Alberto; Luo, Mi
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Emory University
摘要：We quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the United States and are consistent with its skewed cross-sectional distribution and with social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: (i) skewed earnings, (ii) differential saving rates across wealth levels, and (iii) stochastic idiosyncratic returns to wealth. All of these are fundamental for matching both distribution and mobility. The stochastic process for returns which best fits the cross-sectional distri...
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作者：Henry, Emeric; Ottaviani, Marco
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald's classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared fro...
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作者：Abowd, John M.; Schmutte, Ian M.
作者单位：Cornell University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Statistical agencies face a dual mandate to publish accurate statistics while protecting respondent privacy. Increasing privacy protection requires decreased accuracy. Recognizing this as a resource allocation problem, we propose an economic solution: operate where the marginal cost of increasing privacy equals the marginal benefit. Our model of production, from computer science, assumes data are published using an efficient differentially private algorithm. Optimal choice weighs the demand fo...
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作者：Khan, Adnan Q.; Khwaja, Asim Ijaz; Olken, Benjamin A.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue...
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作者：Traiberman, Sharon
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I argue that the winners and losers from trade are decided primarily by occupation. In addition to fixed adjustment costs, workers build up specific human capital over time that is destroyed when they must change occupations. I show that ignoring human capital biases estimates of adjustment costs upward by a factor of 3. Estimating an occupational choice model of the Danish labor market, I show that 57 percent of the dispersion in worker outcomes is accounted for by occupations, and only 16 pe...
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作者：Lorenzoni, Guido; Werning, Ivan
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study slow moving debt crises: self-fulfilling equilibria in which high interest rates, due to the fear of a future default, lead to a gradual but faster accumulation of debt, ultimately validating investors' fear We show that slow moving crises arise in a variety of settings, both when fiscal policy follows a given rule and wizen it is chosen by an optimizing government. A key assumption, in all these settings, is that the borrowing government cannot commit to issue a fixed amount of bonds...
