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作者：Irwin, DA
作者单位：American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
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作者：Currie, J; McConnell, S
作者单位：Mathematica
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作者：Zwiebel, J
摘要：This paper develops a model in which managers voluntarily choose debt to credibly constrain their own future empire-building. Dynamically consistent capital structure is derived as the optimal response in each period of partially entrenched managers trading-off empire-building ambitions with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. A policy of capital structure coordinated with dividends follows naturally, as do implications for the level, frequency, and maturity...
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作者：Findlay, R
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作者：SEN, A
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作者：MARCOUILLER, D; YOUNG, L
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
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作者：AVERY, C; HEYMANN, SJ; ZECKHAUSER, R
作者单位：Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：CASON, TN
摘要：The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances. Under the discriminative auction rules, sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. This paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the EPA auction. Consistent with theoretical predictions, buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient, and increasing the number of buyers increases bids. Buyers facing human o...
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作者：KEITH, A
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作者：BERGSTROM, TC
摘要：This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a ''semi-Kantian'' utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists i...
