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作者：Becker, GS; Philipson, TJ; Soares, RR
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. Welfare is also affected by quantity of life, however, as represented by longevity. This paper incorporates longevity into an overall assessment of the evolution of cross-country inequality and shows that it is quantitatively important. The absence of reduction in cross-country inequality up to the 1990s documented in previous work is in stark contrast to the reduction in inequality af...
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作者：Osborne, MJ; Rosenthal, JS; Turner, MA
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto
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作者：Saint-Paul, G
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb. In the model, firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks. Their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand, as well as on their own price and their neighbor's price. The latter assumption captures local interactions. Despite the fact that the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is characterized by a simple pricing rule ...
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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's response in a market, wherein a firm engages in confidential settlements, may be to reduce demand. A firm committed to openness incurs higher liability and R&D costs, though product demand is not diminished. We identify conditions such that, if...
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作者：Snyder, JM Jr; Ting, MM; Ansolabehere, S
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coaliti...
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作者：Chernew, M; Cutler, D; Keenan, PS
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Schmidt, L
作者单位：Williams College
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作者：Yun, T
作者单位：Kookmin University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model with Calvo-type staggered price-setting. In the paper, the optimal monetary policy maximizes the expected utility of a representative household without having to rely on a. set of linearly approximated equilibrium conditions, given the distortions associated with the staggered price-setting. It shows that the complete stabilization of the price level is optimal in the absence of initial price dispersion, while optimal inflatio...
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作者：Davis, LW
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Winter, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
