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作者：Svensson, LEO
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Beaudry, Paul; Portier, Franck
作者单位：University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universite de Toulouse
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作者：Finkelstein, Amy; McGarry, Kathleen
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care insurance market. Two types of people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals. with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that insur...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Griffith, Rachel; Howitt, Peter
作者单位：Harvard University; Brown University
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
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作者：Piketty, T; Postel-Vinay, G; Rosenthal, JL
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Using large samples of estate tax returns, we construct new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Inequality increased until 1914 because industrial and financial estates grew dramatically. Then, adverse shocks, rather than a Kuznets-type process, led to a massive decline in inequality. The very high wealth concentration prior to 1914 benefited retired individuals living off capital income (rentiers) rather than entrepreneurs. The very rich were in their seventi...
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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts the prices. Units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents' demands decline, and the process continues until every commodity market clears. Bidders, rather than being assumed ...
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作者：Kling, Jeffrey R.
作者单位：Brookings Institution
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作者：Wasmer, Etienne
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Cutler, David; Finkelstein, Amy; Linn, Joshua
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
