An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ausubel, Lawrence M.
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.602
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 602-629
• 关键词: competitive-equilibrium; Ascending auction; gross substitutes; DESIGN

摘要

This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts the prices. Units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents' demands decline, and the process continues until every commodity market clears. Bidders, rather than being assumed to behave as price-takers, are permitted to strategically exercise their market power. Nevertheless, the proposed auction yields Walrasian equilibrium prices and, as from a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, an efficient allocation.