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作者:Kimbrough, Erik O.; Smith, Vernon L.; Wilson, Bart J.
作者单位:George Mason University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要:This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of ...
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作者:Phelps, Edmund S.
作者单位:Columbia University
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作者:Grove, Wayne A.; Wu, Stephen
作者单位:Le Moyne College; Hamilton College
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作者:Akerlof, George A.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者:Jeanne, Olivier; Svensson, Lars E. O.
作者单位:International Monetary Fund; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Livshits, Igor; MacGee, James; Tertilt, Michele
作者单位:Western University (University of Western Ontario); Stanford University
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作者:Karlan, Dean; List, John A.
作者单位:Yale University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:We conducted a natural field experiment to further our understanding of the economics of charity. Using direct mail solicitations to over 50,000 prior donors of a nonprofit organization, we tested the effectiveness of a matching grant on charitable giving. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the response rate. Larger match ratios (i.e., $3:$1 and $2:$1) relative to a smaller match ratio ($1:$1) had no additional impact, however. The results provide aven...
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作者:Gerking, Shelby; Morgan, William E.
作者单位:State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; University of Wyoming
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作者:Abel, Andrew B.; Eberly, Janice C.; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
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作者:Edelman, Benjamin; Ostrovsky, Michael; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位:Harvard University; Stanford University; Yahoo! Inc
摘要:We investigate the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has ...