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作者:He, Weitao; Li, Haohao; Liu, Luning
作者单位:Harbin Institute of Technology; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要:Despite widespread recognition that institutional environment shapes citizen behavior, we have limited understanding of how anti-corruption efforts influence citizens' willingness to challenge government actions through formal accountability mechanisms. This study examines how provincial leaders' corruption convictions affect citizen-initiated administrative litigation in China, exploring the mediating role of judicial remedies and the moderating effect of local corruption environments. Drawin...
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作者:Krause, George A.; Hong, Ji Hyeun
作者单位:University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要:One critical way that public agencies can improve administrative performance is through its discretionary efforts at detecting program errors. This requires an alignment between political and administrative objectives within executive branch governance. Specifically, we hypothesize that agency efforts for detecting benefit overpayment errors from state unemployment insurance (UI) programs will be higher under Republican partisan gubernatorial control of state UI agency heads compared to Democr...
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作者:Bel, Germa; Espaillat, Pedro; Esteve, Marc
作者单位:University of Barcelona; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE); University of London; University College London; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE)
摘要:Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is promoted as a model that improves results, enhances quality, reduces costs, and increases accountability. It has become a standard element of government contracting worldwide and a key component of newer pay-for-success models. However, scholarly evaluations remain scattered and often lack a solid theoretical foundation. This study conducts a meta-analysis of 740 observations from 38 studies across 10 service areas to evaluate genuine performance. Utilizi...