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作者：Beutel, Johannes; Weber, Michael
作者单位：Deutsche Bundesbank; Purdue University System; Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We causally test alternative theories of expectation formation. Using a randomized information experiment we show overreaction is a key feature of individuals' return expectations, and individuals' response to the price-earnings ratio is opposite of academic consensus. Our evidence is inconsistent with standard models of expectation formation, but subjective mental models that deviate from objective benchmarks can jointly explain the updating behavior in the experiment, the link between indivi...
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作者：Schneider, Andres
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：I study the yield curve dynamics in a general equilibrium model with financial intermediaries facing financing constraints. When constraints bind, intermediaries reallocate their portfolios, causing deadweight losses in aggregate consumption, thus affecting savers' marginal utility. Because the yield curve is a forecast of marginal utility, intermediaries' constraints show up, via general equilibrium forces, in long-term yields. I show that the mechanism connecting intermediaries' constraints ...
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作者：Bonelli, Maxime
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：How does the increased use of data technologies, like machine learning, by financial intermediaries affect the allocation of capital towards innovation? I study this question in the context of startup financing by venture capitalists (VCs). While VCs adopting data technologies become better at screening startups similar to those in historical data, they tilt their investments towards this pool and become concurrently less likely to finance innovative startups that achieve rare major success. P...
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作者：Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Phelan, Gregory
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Williams College
摘要：In March 2020, safe asset markets experienced surprising and unprecedented price crashes. We explain how strategic investor behavior can create such market fragility in a model with investors valuing safety, investors valuing liquidity, and constrained dealers. While safety investors and liquidity investors can form a symbiotic relationship with offsetting trades during times of stress, strategic interactions among liquidity investors harbor the potential for self-fulfilling fragility. When th...
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作者：Ma, Yiming; Zeng, Yao; Zhang, Anthony Lee
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago
摘要：Stablecoins are cryptoassets designed to be pegged to the dollar, but they are backed by imperfectly liquid USD assets. We show that stablecoins feature concentrated arbitrage: the largest issuer, Tether, allows only six agents in an average month to redeem stablecoins for cash. We argue that the issuers' choice of arbitrage concentration reflects a trade-off: efficient arbitrage improves stablecoin price stability in secondary markets but amplifies run risks by reducing investors' price impac...
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作者：Gorback, Caitlin S.; Keys, Benjamin J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We estimate price elasticities of housing supply for U.S. cities by examining the impact of foreign purchases on housing prices and quantities. After other countries introduced foreign-buyer taxes beginning in 2011, both house prices and quantities increased more in locations with high foreign-born populations. An increase in global capital inflows, instrumented with tax policy changes scaled by immigrant exposure, increased prices and quantities over 2011-2018. We combine these estimates to c...
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作者：Cabezon, Felipe; Hoberg, Gerard
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Southern California
摘要：We first document that, despite potential legal issues, overlapping directors are surprisingly prevalent among direct competitors. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, we find that competing firms in markets with dense overlapping-director networks experience innovation herding, lose product differentiation, and, ultimately, perform poorly. Novel text-based network propagation tests of technologies show that intellectual property leakage plays a role as firms with dense...
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作者：Li, Jian; Pegoraro, Stefano
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：We model credit competition between a bigtech platform and a bank lending to a merchant under limited commitment and asymmetric information about the merchant's incentives to default. The platform leverages its control over a marketplace to enforce partial loan repayments, enabling it to serve certain unbanked borrowers. When directly competing with the bank, the platform gains an endogenous screening advantage as borrowers with stronger incentives to default self-select into bank loans to avo...
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作者：Capponi, Agostino; Jia, Ruizhe; Yu, Shihao
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) allow traders to express their willingness to pay for quick execution through a public priority fee bidding mechanism. We provide evidence that high-fee DEX trades are more informative and contribute more to price discovery. Using address-level blockchain transaction data, we show that informed traders persistently bid higher fees to secure early execution, revealing a strong willingness to pay for execution priority. Further, analysis of Ethereum mempool data de...
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作者：Burkart, Mike; Lee, Samuel; Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Swedish House of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; Santa Clara University; University of Gothenburg
摘要：We study the structure of public firm buyouts in a model that features the Berle-Means problem (lack of incentives) and the Grossman-Hart problem (holdout). We find that bootstrapping, debt in excess of funding needs, and upfront fees to bidders are socially optimal and increase buyout premiums. These elements make LBO financing tantamount to a management contract arranged by an outside manager to receive cash and incentives to manage a firm-except the cash is funded by excess debt imposed on ...
