Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ma, Yiming; Zeng, Yao; Zhang, Anthony Lee
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag072
• 发表日期: 2026-09-11
• 关键词: G01; G23; FINANCIAL-INTERMEDIARIES; Deposit insurance; Bank runs; money; equilibrium; liquidity; fragility; COMPETITION; DYNAMICS; MODEL

摘要

Stablecoins are cryptoassets designed to be pegged to the dollar, but they are backed by imperfectly liquid USD assets. We show that stablecoins feature concentrated arbitrage: the largest issuer, Tether, allows only six agents in an average month to redeem stablecoins for cash. We argue that the issuers' choice of arbitrage concentration reflects a trade-off: efficient arbitrage improves stablecoin price stability in secondary markets but amplifies run risks by reducing investors' price impact from selling stablecoins. Our findings imply that policies designed to improve stablecoin price stability may have the unintended consequence of increasing stablecoin run risks.