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作者:de Figueiredo, John M.; Stiglitz, Edward H.
作者单位:Duke University; Duke University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
摘要:Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tools of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s-as a way of creating presidential legislative history to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the...
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作者:Potter, Trevor
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作者:Wright, Jonathan
作者单位:American University
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作者:Goldstein, Matthew D.
作者单位:American University
摘要:Minorig individuals are disproportionately charged and convicted of crimes in this country. Making matters worse is the fact that many housing providers use criminal history housing applications that disparately impact minoriy housing applicants. In 2016, after the US. Supreme Court held in 2015 that disparate impact liabiliy was cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued legal guidance to address how disparate impact liabiliy specifical...
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作者:Pierce, Richard J., Jr.
作者单位:George Washington University
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作者:Morris, Charles J.
作者单位:Southern Methodist University
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作者:Feinstein, Brian D.
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:Those seeking to restore Congress's place as a co-equal branch should consider the architecture of the administrative state. Despite increased scholarly attention concerning both the design of executive agencies and Congress's role in governance, the impact of institutional features on executive agencies' susceptibiliy to congressional attention is largely unknown. Leveraging original data on committee oversight hearings, this Article explores the connections between various agency design feat...
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作者:Cass, Ronald A.
作者单位:Boston University
摘要:Today, administrative rules are far more numerous than the laws enacted by Congress, cover far more pages in the relevant legal codes, account for far more regulatory commands, and have profound effects on American economy and society. Although administrative rules can provide substantial public ben fit, legal constraints on the scope of administrative authoriy and on the processes by which it is employed provide critical protections. Courts, when asked, can review the legality of these rules;...
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作者:Mccaskey, Daniel
作者单位:American University