SIGNING STATEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIALIZING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Figueiredo, John M.; Stiglitz, Edward H.
• 署名单位: Duke University; Duke University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8368
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 841-868
• 关键词: POWER; COURTS

摘要

Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tools of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s-as a way of creating presidential legislative history to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date. Three main findings emerge from this analysis. First, contrary to the pervasive (and legitimate) fears in the literature on signing statements, courts rarely cite signing statements in their decisions. Second, in the aggregate, when courts cite signing statements, thy cite them in predictably partisan ways, with judges citing Presidents' signing statements from their own political parties more often than those of the opposing parties. This eat, however, is driven entirely by the behavior of Republican-appointed appellate jurists. Third, courts predominately employ signing statements to buttress aligned statutory text and conventional sources of legislative history and seemingly never rely on them to override contrary plain statutory text or even unified traditional legislative history. This suggests that signing statements have low rank among interpretative tools and courts primarily use them to complement rather than substitute for congressional legislative history. In this sense, presidents have largely failed to establish an alternative corpus of valid interpretive material.