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作者：Carstensen, Martin B.; Schmidt, Vivien A.
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Boston University
摘要：Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the winners of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in t...
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作者：Beaulieu, Emily
作者单位：University of Kentucky
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作者：Lee, Don S.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find ...
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作者：Pai, Sudha
作者单位：Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
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作者：Meyerrose, Anna M.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Research on the European Parliament finds legislative voting patterns remained constant following the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. This article shows that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from these new member states are actually more likely to vote along European party lines. Given that these MEPs often come from less institutionalized domestic party systems that lack norms of legislative discipline, we should expect them to exhibit more erratic voting behavior than MEP...
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作者：Zhu, Xufeng; Zhao, Hui
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Capital Normal University
摘要：This article explores the complicated triangular architecture among innovation diffusion, fiscal recentralization, and authoritarian welfare regimes. We argue that local governments' adoption of innovative welfare policies attracts the attention of central authorities who tend to recognize spontaneous local innovation by releasing central administrative signals. During the era of fiscal recentralization starting from the Chinese Tax-Sharing System Reform in 1994, cities with higher fiscal depe...
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作者：Meckling, Jonas; Nahm, Jonas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for eff...
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作者：Gains, Francesca; Lowndes, Vivien
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Birmingham
摘要：Research on gender equality policy has generally focused on actors and institutions at the national and international levels. This article considers the role of local-level actors and institutions in explaining different policy responses to violence against women and girls (VAWG). The literature on gender policy trajectories identifies the particular importance of executive actors in influencing status policies like VAWG. Quantitative data are analyzed to show how local Police and Crime Commis...
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作者：Ahuja, Amit; Ostermann, Susan L.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process-tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state-based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advanta...
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作者：Kraft, Michael E.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Green Bay
