From quiescent bureaucracy to undocumented wonder: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ahuja, Amit; Ostermann, Susan L.
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Notre Dame
刊物名称：
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0952-1895
DOI：
10.1111/gove.12339
发表日期：
2018
关键词：
摘要：
Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process-tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state-based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state-based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.
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