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作者：Rittberger, Berthold; Ruffing, Eva; Weinrich, Martin; Wonka, Arndt
作者单位：University of Munich; University Osnabruck; University of Bremen
摘要：In the past decades, European Union (EU) agencies have proliferated to address a plethora of governance problems. When designing EU agencies, EU legislators confront a tension: Legislators want agencies to be competent problem-solvers, but they also want to keep agencies under control. How do EU legislators balance these two imperatives? We argue that agencies' political principals do not necessarily have to trade competence for control, and vice versa, but can draw on different institutional ...
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作者：Bassoli, Matteo; Campomori, Francesca
作者单位：University of Padua; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the arrival of 170,000 refugees, the already fragile Italian refugee system was forced to undergo major re-structuring and expansion. Re-organisation included the adoption of partially new multi-level governance relationships, as well as political instruments. Despite the widespread positive attitude of public opinion toward the Ukrainian refugees and the bipartisan support for their reception, the outcome of the policy has been not in line with...
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作者：Gawthorpe, Steven; Pozsgai-Alvarez, Joseph
作者单位：Charles University Prague; University of Osaka
摘要：How do we know when corruption has become widespread? Despite the rich body of literature on the problem, there are few proposed methods to conceptualize and empirically identify it within a geographic context. Using spatial analysis, this paper expands the means to identify corruption as an informal institution by examining the degree to which favoritism-in the form of preferential treatment for politically connected firms-is widespread in the Czech procurement sector. Using the conceptual gu...
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作者：Wang, Xiaoyun; Zhan, Xueyong; Xu, Yushan
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Privatization reform originated in Western countries and was translated across political regimes. While extensive literature discusses the practices of privatization in liberal democracies, little has been written on its implementation in authoritarian contexts, where the logic of privatization is incompatible with the logic of authoritarianism. This study explores the adoption of a specific administrative model promoted by the privatization reform: nonprofit board governance in Shenzhen, Chin...
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作者：Chen, Xing; Shen, Xiaoxiao; Zhuge, Andong
作者单位：Fudan University; Yale University; Fudan University
摘要：This study firstly examines the causal effect of environmental information disclosure on political trust and then provides a novel psychological mechanism through which the effect occurred. Exploiting the staggered rolled-out implementation of a national program in China that provides real-time air-pollution information to the public, we find that air pollution adversely moderates the positive effect of information disclosure on political trust. Notably and surprisingly, this adverse moderatio...
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作者：Pickering, Heath; Bellens, Tom; Brans, Marleen
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：Chiefs of Staff to heads of government hold a prominent position at the apex of the political executive. However, our knowledge of the personal and professional backgrounds of these unelected actors is surprisingly patchy. Not only is this an empirical gap, but it is also problematic as interactions between actors within political executives shape political decisions and ministerial operations. For this study, we present the most systematic dataset mapping the profiles of 56 chiefs of staff to...
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作者：Zhang, Dong
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：The resurgence of populism has presented a grave threat to democratic governance across the globe. Drawing on a cross-national dataset of 155 countries from 1960 to 2020, we leverage the leadership turnovers within countries and use fixed effects models to estimate the effect of populist leadership on corruption. We find that populist leadership is associated with a substantial increase in executive corruption, but not other types of corruption. We also provide evidence that populist leaders a...
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作者：Mahmalat, Mounir; Maktabi, Wassim
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：We study cartels in public infrastructure procurement and analyze the conditions under which they succeed in generating rents. We first conceptualize the interplay of the central actors of a procurement project, notably the contractor, the procurement agency, as well as the supervision and design consultants. By focusing on consultants, our framework includes important yet understudied actors in cartels that design tenders, evaluate bids, and supervise the implementation of projects. We go on ...
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作者：Batista, Mariana; Michener, Gregory
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
摘要：Freedom of information (FOI) laws are known to expose governmental weaknesses, but do they improve the structural workings of public administration, professionalizing governance? This study examines FOI's effect on a cornerstone of effective governance-bureaucratic hiring. Using coarsened matching methods to compare over 5400 municipalities in Brazil-approximately half possessing FOI regulations and half without-we identify significant reductions in discretionary patronage-based appointments. ...
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作者：Shalaby, Marwa; Williamson, Scott
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Bocconi University
摘要：When are executives in authoritarian regimes more likely to comply with formal legislative powers? Building from theories of authoritarian power-sharing, we argue that executives will be more likely to respect legislative prerogatives when protests or elite organization increase the ability of legislators to undermine the executive's political position. We evaluate this argument by analyzing novel protest and legislative data in Jordan between 2010 and 2015. In line with our expectations, we f...
