Cartels in infrastructure procurement-Evidence from Lebanon

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mahmalat, Mounir; Maktabi, Wassim
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12845
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: POLITICALLY CONNECTED BOARDS; public procurement; CORRUPTION; number

摘要

We study cartels in public infrastructure procurement and analyze the conditions under which they succeed in generating rents. We first conceptualize the interplay of the central actors of a procurement project, notably the contractor, the procurement agency, as well as the supervision and design consultants. By focusing on consultants, our framework includes important yet understudied actors in cartels that design tenders, evaluate bids, and supervise the implementation of projects. We go on to explore an original dataset of infrastructure procurement contracts in Lebanon and analyze the conditions under which powerful political elites can broker deals to overprice and/or overspend contracts. To examine how cartels operate, we identify the political connections of contractors and consultants and classify them according to their quality in terms of access to institutional functions of the implementing agency. We argue that design consultants serve as the lynchpin of the cartel by reducing transaction costs for searching, bargaining, and enforcing of corrupt deals.