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作者:Kumar, Tanu
作者单位:Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University
摘要:When do unelected officials respond to citizen complaints, and what are the implications for service delivery? In the formal complaint system for Mumbai's water sector, bureaucrats addressed 44% of the roughly 20,000 complaints lodged from 2016 to 2018. In line with literature on distributive politics, responsiveness to marginalized citizens is lower. Yet in interviews, officials emphasize that programmatic goals and capacity constraints lead to prioritization by what the complaint is about. I...
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作者:Overmans, Tom; Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan
作者单位:Utrecht University
摘要:Decades of research emphasized collective behaviors in public budgeting, yet individual budget preferences remain underexplored. This paper argues that both well-known and lesser-known cognitive biases distort politicians' budget judgment, resulting in biased preferences. To test this, we conducted five preregistered experiments examining the impact of five biases-anchoring, herding, mental accounting, availability bias, and loss aversion-on budget preferences. Using data from 1825 municipal b...
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作者:Toral, Guillermo
作者单位:IE University
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作者:Hyde, B. V. E.
作者单位:University of Bristol; Bangor University; University of London; University College London; Durham University
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作者:Martinsson, Joel
作者单位:Linnaeus University
摘要:In what ways, if at all, does transparency influence how politicians cooperate with interest organizations? While there are convincing normative arguments stressing the importance of transparency in politics, empirical evidence for how transparency in practice affects how politicians reason regarding cooperating with interest organizations is scarce. In this article, I address this gap by conducting a mixed method survey experiment with 1659 Swedish politicians. The findings indicate that a la...
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作者:Xiao, Shiyang; Hou, Yilin; Lovely, Mary
作者单位:Zhejiang University; Syracuse University; Peterson Institute for International Economics
摘要:Effective governance requires maintaining a balance between central political control and subnational discretion. However, empirical evidence remains limited and thin on how different central control instruments may affect the level of subnational discretion. In this study, we argue that top-down inspection, as an instrument of central political control, may disrupt subnational discretion in policymaking, that is, subnational discretion repeatedly declines and then rebounds toward its initial ...
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作者:Brierley, Sarah
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者:Bravo-Laguna, Carlos; Levi-Faur, David
作者单位:Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要:The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under-researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the ...
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作者:Leijon, Karin; Moberg, Linda
作者单位:Uppsala University; Uppsala University
摘要:This article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish ca...
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作者:Heinzel, Mirko; Reinsberg, Bernhard; Swedlund, Haley
作者单位:University of Glasgow; University of Cambridge; Radboud University Nijmegen
摘要:Can public agencies boost support for their mandate by being more transparent? We examine this important question in the context of foreign aid. Skepticism about foreign aid spending is common among citizens. This article argues that bilateral aid agencies can increase support for foreign aid by enhancing transparency. The article presents findings from three survey experiments involving a representative sample of 2058 British citizens, as well as observational data at the cross-national level...