Top-Down Central Inspection and Subnational Discretion in Policymaking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xiao, Shiyang; Hou, Yilin; Lovely, Mary
• 署名单位: Zhejiang University; Syracuse University; Peterson Institute for International Economics
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.70013
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: china; decentralization; ACCOUNTABILITY; SYSTEM; POWER; MODEL

摘要

Effective governance requires maintaining a balance between central political control and subnational discretion. However, empirical evidence remains limited and thin on how different central control instruments may affect the level of subnational discretion. In this study, we argue that top-down inspection, as an instrument of central political control, may disrupt subnational discretion in policymaking, that is, subnational discretion repeatedly declines and then rebounds toward its initial or normal level. This phenomenon is most likely to occur when top-down inspection is combined with an under-institutionalized accountability system. We test this proposition by examining the effect of central disciplinary inspections on the patterns of provincial industrial policymaking in China. Using a novel dataset of 612 central-level and 1907 provincial-level industrial policies adopted between 2001 and 2019, we find that provincial discretion in industrial policymaking decreases significantly during the early-warning phase and the closing phase of inspection, and rebounds toward its original level during the dormant phase of inspection. Further analysis suggests that informal ties between central and provincial political leaders have a moderating effect on the disruption from inspection.