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• Do investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if forecast accuracy is all that matters? AI翻译
  作者：Clement, MB; Tse, SY
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
  摘要：Prior research suggests that investors' response to analyst forecast revisions increases with the analyst's forecast accuracy. We extend this research by examining whether investors appear to extract all of the information that analyst characteristics provide about forecast accuracy. We find that only some of the analyst characteristics that are associated with future forecast accuracy are also associated with return responses to forecast revisions. This suggests that investors fail to extract...
• Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports AI翻译
  作者：Carcello, JV; Neal, TL
  作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Kentucky
  摘要：One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports that Big 6 firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern reports. In addition, we find ...
• Social behaviors, enforcement, and tax compliance dynamics AI翻译
  作者：Davis, JS; Hecht, G; Perkins, JD
  作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
  摘要：We analyze the effect of social norms and enforcement on the dynamics of taxpayer compliance. Specifically, we develop two models to evaluate the movement between classes of compliant and noncompliant taxpayers. Our analysis suggests that the effect on compliance of changing enforcement levels depends on whether the taxpayer population is initially compliant or noncompliant. Compliant populations are insensitive to changes in enforcement policies until enforcement becomes sufficiently lax, whe...
• Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: Incentive and retention effects AI翻译
  作者：Dutta, S
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
  摘要：This paper considers an agency model in which a firm's manager receives private information about an investment project. The manager has unique skills that are essential for implementing the project, and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture on his own. The firm's owner thus faces a potential managerial retention problem, where the severity of the retention problem depends on the project's outside viability. My analysis shows that if the managerial retention proble...