Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: Incentive and retention effects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutta, S
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.71
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 71-93
• 关键词: organizational slack; performance; INFORMATION; income; cost

摘要

This paper considers an agency model in which a firm's manager receives private information about an investment project. The manager has unique skills that are essential for implementing the project, and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture on his own. The firm's owner thus faces a potential managerial retention problem, where the severity of the retention problem depends on the project's outside viability. My analysis shows that if the managerial retention problem is not too severe, the owner can delegate the investment decision to the manager and use a residual-income-based bonus contract to give the manager incentives to work hard and make appropriate investment decisions. If the retention problem is severe, however, then the owner must use an option-based compensation contract to retain the manager and provide him with appropriate incentives. I also establish that as the managerial retention problem becomes more severe, the owner reduces the rate of return, or hurdle rate, required to approve the investment project. These results predict that new-economy firms, in which managerial expertise is critical and yet mobile, are more likely to (1) include stock options in their managers' compensation contracts, and (2) apply lower hurdle rates for approving capital investments.