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作者:Macve, Richard
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者:Mumford, Michael J.
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作者:McAnally, Mary Lea; Srivastava, Anup; Weaver, Connie D.
作者单位:Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要:This paper examines whether stock-option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock-price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior ...
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作者:Dyreng, Scott D.; Hanlon, Michelle; Maydew, Edward L.
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the long-run cash effective tax rate. We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine (1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and (2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 ...
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作者:Kadous, Kathryn; Magro, Anne M.; Spilker, Brian C.
作者单位:Emory University; George Mason University; Brigham Young University
摘要:Prior research indicates that audit and tax professionals' judgments are influenced by their client's preferences, both directly and indirectly (via information search). In an experiment with tax professionals as participants, we examine whether high practice risk (i.e., exposure to monetary and nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations) mitigates these effects. We find that, when facing a client with low practice risk, professionals' search is biased in a manner that leads jud...
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作者:Zeff, Stephen A.
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作者:Zeff, Stephen A.
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作者:Drake, Andrea R.; Haka, Susan E.
作者单位:University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; Michigan State University
摘要:Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups. When negotiators share fine information they achieve more efficient bar...
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作者:Hughes, John S.; Williams, Michael G.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Oregon
摘要:In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of pre-production commitments made by firms competing in oligopoly markets and disclosure of such commitments. By commitments we refer to any device that provides a strategic incentive to alter production choices. Examples include forward contracts, capital structure, research and development investment, terms of compensation, and cost allocation. If the only purpose underlying commitment is to gain a strategic advantage in product market competiti...