Does ABC information exacerbate hold-up problems in buyer-supplier negotiations?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drake, Andrea R.; Haka, Susan E.
• 署名单位: University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr.2008.83.1.29
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 29-60
• 关键词: Strategic uncertainty; coordination failure; RISK; RENEGOTIATION; investments; preferences; CONTRACTS; fairness; japanese; DESIGN

摘要

Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups. When negotiators share fine information they achieve more efficient bargaining agreements. However, we find that strategic concerns about inequitable outcomes (fear of opportunistic behavior) lead fewer negotiating pairs to share fine information (where inequitable outcomes can be larger) than coarse information (where inequitable outcomes are smaller). Our results demonstrate that information fineness leads negotiators to trade-off potential utility losses due to fairness considerations and potential monetary gains. Fewer (more) negotiators chose to share fine (coarse) information and thus minimize fairness based utility losses (maximize monetary gains).