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作者：Cheng, Mandy M.; Humphreys, Kerry A.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This study examines the effect that two key balanced scorecard (BSC) framework elements-causal linkages between strategic objectives in the strategy map and performance measures categorized by scorecard perspective-have on managers' ability to interpret the strategic relevance of external information and use this information to evaluate the appropriateness of an organization's strategy. We conduct two experiments, finding that presenting a set of strategic objectives as a strategy map enhances...
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作者：Lee, Lian Fen
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：This study examines when firms inflate reported cash from operations in the statement of cash flows (CFO) and the mechanisms through which firms manage CFO. CFO management is distinct from earnings management. Unlike the manipulation of accruals, firms cannot manage CFO with biased estimates, but must resort to classification and timing. I identify four firm characteristics associated with incentives to inflate reported CFO: (1) financial distress, (2) a long-term credit rating near the invest...
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作者：Kim, Yongtae; Park, Myung Seok; Wier, Benson
作者单位：Santa Clara University; Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manag...
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作者：Schmidt, Jaime J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study investigates whether audit litigants act as if they believe jurors will associate auditor-provided nonaudit services (NAS) with impaired auditor independence, and thus substandard auditor performance. Using GAAP-based financial statement restatements disclosed from 2001-2007 as an indicator for audit failure, I find that the amount of NAS fees and the ratio of NAS fees to total fees is positively associated with the likelihood that a restatement results in audit litigation. I also f...
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作者：Maas, Victor S.; van Rinsum, Marcel; Towry, Kristy L.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Emory University
摘要：This paper investigates managerial discretion in compensation decisions in a team setting, in which a measure of the team's aggregate performance is readily available from the accounting system. Specifically, we examine the willingness of managers to obtain additional, costly information that would supplement this measure and allow the managers to more accurately assess individual contributions to team output. Using theory from behavioral economics that incorporates social preferences (i.e., f...
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作者：Chen, Clara Xiaoling; Williamson, Michael G.; Zhou, Flora H.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：In an environment where three-person groups develop a creative solution to an important problem, we examine whether the efficacy of either individual- or group-based creativity-contingent incentives depends on whether they take the piece-rate or tournament form. We predict and find that group (intergroup) tournament pay increases group cohesion and collaborative efforts, which ultimately lead to a more creative group solution, relative to group piece-rate pay. While individual (intragroup) tou...
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作者：Indjejikian, Raffi J.; Matejka, Michal
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We use survey data to examine firms' propensity to rely on financial measures in evaluating local business unit managers. We find that firms rely less on financial measures (and more on nonfinancial measures or subjective evaluations) in determining local managers' bonuses when those managers have greater influence over the design of internal accounting systems. At the same time, we find no significant association between the choice of performance measures and local managers' authority to make...
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作者：Bens, Daniel A.; Goodman, Theodore H.; Neamtiu, Monica
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This study examines whether managers alter their financial reporting decisions in the face of investment-related pressure. We define investment-related pressure as the increased pressure managers feel to retain their job following an M&A poorly received by the market. We hypothesize that managers attempt to assuage pressure by delivering strong performance post-merger, creating incentives for misreporting. Our findings indicate that acquirers with more negative M&A announcement returns are mor...
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作者：Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Radhakrishnan, Suresh; Tsang, Albert; Yang, Yong George
作者单位：University of Arizona; Korea University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine the relationship between disclosure of nonfinancial information and analyst forecast accuracy using firm-level data from 31 countries. We use the issuance of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports to proxy for disclosure of nonfinancial information. We find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error. This relationship is stronger in countries that are more stakeholder-oriented-i.e., in countries where CSR performan...
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作者：Christ, Margaret H.; Sedatole, Karen L.; Towry, Kristy L.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Michigan State University; Emory University
摘要：In this study, we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an incomplete contract setting, in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the agent is responsible, the agent's trust in the principal is relevant. In this setting, we predict that bonu...
