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作者：Tan, Hun-Tong; Yeo, Feng
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要：We examine how managers' accounting estimates are affected by whether they are informed about an impending critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure from a close or distant auditor. A close (distant) auditor is one who has a smaller (greater) social distance from the client in terms of their working relationship. We predict and find that being informed about an impending CAM by a close (distant) auditor leads to more (less) aggressive estimates than if managers are not informed. With a close audi...
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作者：Jayaraman, Sudarshan; Milbourn, Todd; Peters, Florian; Seo, Hojun
作者单位：University of Rochester; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Amsterdam; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We investigate the role of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) theory in CEO pay and turnover using a product similarity-based definition of peers (Hoberg and Phillips 2016). RPE predicts that firms filter out common shocks (i.e., those affecting the firm and its peers) while evaluating CEO performance, and that the extent of filtering increases with the number of peers. Despite the intuitive appeal of the theory, previous tests of RPE find weak and inconsistent evidence, which we argue is d...
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作者：Kays, Allison
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：In order to deter aggressive tax planning, the Australian government mandated public disclosure of three line items from large corporations' tax returns. However, there is no evidence that the mandated disclosure led public firms to pay more taxes (Hoopes, Robinson, and Slemrod 2018). Instead, I find that firms strategically offset expected reputational costs by voluntarily issuing supplemental information. Specifically, when managers expect new reputational costs from the mandated tax return ...
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作者：Beyer, Anne; Dye, Ronald A.
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span all equity'' contracts, all debt'' contracts, and all enterprise value'' contracts. We show: (1) under both all equity'' and all debt'' contracts, increased debt always leads to r...
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作者：Call, Andrew C.; Donovan, John B.; Jennings, Jared
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Notre Dame; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We examine whether lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower's earnings as inputs when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. We find that, among debt contracts that include an earnings covenant, earnings thresholds are set closer to analyst forecasts when analysts have historically issued more accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to firm fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. Further, we find that, following a plausibly exogenous decline...
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作者：Ge, Rui; Ji, Yuan; Louis, Henock
作者单位：Shenzhen University; Audencia; University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We show that the number of governance provisions imposed on a firm by a strategic alliance partner decreases with the firm's accounting quality. This effect is weaker when the firm has greater bargaining power and stronger when the alliance project is riskier. Moreover, the net benefit to an alliance partner of imposing an additional governance provision on its counterparty apparently increases when the counterparty accounting quality is low, resulting in an enhancement of the partner's market...
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作者：Bourveau, Thomas; Brochet, Francois; Ferri, Fabrizio; Sun, Chengzhu
作者单位：Columbia University; Boston University; University of Miami; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives' incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000- 2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. T...
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作者：Jame, Russell; Markov, Stanimir; Wolfe, Michael C.
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
摘要：We examine how increased competition stemming from an innovation in financial technology influences sell-side analyst research quality. We find that firms added to Estimize, an open platform that crowdsources short-term earnings forecasts, experience a pervasive and substantial reduction in consensus bias and a limited increase in consensus accuracy relative to matched control firms. Long-term forecasts and investment recommendations remain similarly biased, alleviating the concern that the do...
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作者：Yoon, Aaron S.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I use the announcement of a market liberalization pilot program in China as a shock to firms' disclosure environment and examine how Chinese firms, foreign investors, and foreign brokers respond. Using a proprietary dataset, I find that affected firms respond to the announcement by significantly increasing the number of selective private meetings hosted by major foreign brokers, but do not use public disclosure channels. I find this increase in private disclosure to be stronger among firms tha...
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作者：Rickmann, Georg A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Market prices and trading are important information constructs that reveal information to market participants. I study how the observability of market prices and trading (hereafter, market transparency) affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable. I find that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices/trading become observable, suggesting that investors' access to market information l...
