Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Beyer, Anne; Dye, Ronald A.
署名单位：
Stanford University; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
ACCOUNTING REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0001-4826
DOI：
10.2308/TAR-2018-0631
发表日期：
2021
页码：
111-130
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span all equity'' contracts, all debt'' contracts, and all enterprise value'' contracts. We show: (1) under both all equity'' and all debt'' contracts, increased debt always leads to reduced voluntary disclosure; (2) under all enterprise value'' contracts, increased debt has no effect on voluntary disclosure; (3) for all contracts that place positive weight on both equity and enterprise values, more debt leads to less (respectively, more) disclosure if the initial debt level is low (respectively, high); (4) increasing the weight on equity prices always induces less disclosure, so: (5) all equity'' contracts minimize disclosures, and all debt'' contracts maximize disclosures.
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