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作者：Armstrong, Christopher S.; Glaeser, Stephen A.; Huang, Sterling
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Singapore Management University
摘要：We examine how executives' ability to control their firms' exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Our natural experimental evidence shows that exchange-traded weather derivatives allow executives to control their firms' exposure to weather risk. Once these derivatives became available, those executives who use them to hedge experience relative reductions in their total compensation and equity incentives. The decline in compensation is consistent with a r...
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作者：Chan, Eric W.; Zhang, Xinyu
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Cornell University
摘要：We experimentally examine how nonprofit pay levels affect nonprofit managers' misreporting and how different types of penalties deter such behavior. Absent any penalties for misreporting, we find similar levels of, but different mechanisms for, misreporting by managers who select into lower-versus higher-paying nonprofits. Specifically, lower-paying nonprofits attract mission-focused managers who misreport to advance their nonprofit's mission and justify doing so by their personal sacrifice of...
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作者：Cazier, Richard A.; McMullin, Jeff L.; Treu, John S.
作者单位：University of North Texas System; University of North Texas Denton; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; West Virginia University
摘要：Although formal guidance instructs firms to avoid issuing lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures, regulators and users of financial statements note these disclosures are excessively long and boilerplate. The persistence of these characteristics is surprising given that prior research finds that firms disclosing lengthy and boilerplate risk factors experience negative capital market consequences. We investigate two potential sources of firms' incentives to issue such disclosures by exa...
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作者：Brazel, Joseph F.; Leiby, Justin; Schaefer, Tammie J.
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Kansas City
摘要：In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the...
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作者：Clinch, Greg; Li, Wei
作者单位：Deakin University; University of Adelaide
摘要：Short sellers assist in impounding negative news more quickly into stock prices and improve price informativeness. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence about whether short sellers trade predominantly in anticipation of, or in response to, a public information release. To shed light on this question, we exploit Reg SHO, which reduced the constraints faced by short sellers for a subsample of U.S. firms, to examine price informativeness before, during, and after earnings announcements....
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作者：Bauer, Andrew M.; Fang, Xiaohua; Pittman, Jeffrey A.
作者单位：University of Waterloo; State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University; Memorial University Newfoundland; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk r...
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作者：Bilinski, Pawel; Bradshaw, Mark T.
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; Boston College
摘要：In contrast to the disappearing dividends view prevalent in the literature, we document extensive dividend payments by firms and significant variability within firms and across 16 countries during 2000-2013. We predict that within-firm variability in dividends increases investor demand for forward-looking dividend information, and analysts respond by producing informative dividend forecasts. We find that analyst dividend forecasts are available for most dividend-paying firms and are more preva...
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作者：Hansen, James C.; Lisic, Ling Lei; Seidel, Timothy A.; Wilkins, Michael S.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; Weber State University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Brigham Young University; University of Kansas
摘要：Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the...
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作者：Hong, Hyun A.; Ryou, Ji Woo; Srivastava, Anup
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; West Virginia University; University of Calgary
摘要：Firms provide convexity in managers' compensation plans (vega) to induce risk-averse managers to pursue risky, positive net present value projects. The resulting alignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives creates conflicts with lenders, who face an increased risk of default when managers pursue risky investments. We hypothesize that lenders would respond by stepping up their monitoring and threatening foreclosure to inhibit managers from acting on their vega incentives. Strong lender ...
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作者：Beck, Matthew J.; Nicoletti, Allison K.; Stuber, Sarah B.
作者单位：University of Kansas; University of Pennsylvania; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：Auditor credibility is important in the banking industry due to the opacity of bank assets and the use of financial statements by external parties to facilitate monitoring. Depositors monitor and discipline bank behavior, but they can also contribute to the spread of shocks from one bank to another. We argue that depositors perceive bank failure as an audit failure, which reduces their assessment of auditor credibility. We document that exposure to failure through the audit firm is associated ...
