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作者：Bradshaw, Mark T.; Lee, Lian Fen; Peterson, Kyle
作者单位：Boston College; University of Oregon
摘要：We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell -side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research-voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand -collected data permit cross-sectional and time -series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. F...
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作者：Zufarov, Rustam
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：I examine whether and to what extent firms credibly disclose proprietary private information ahead of seasoned equity offerings. I assess proprietary information disclosures based on the magnitude of the association between a private information-based proxy and stock returns. Using a difference-in-differences design around the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) of 2005, which relaxed restrictions on disclosures, I find that equity-issuing firms disclose more than twice as much proprietary inform...
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作者：Cahan, Steven F.; Chen, Chen; Chen, Li
作者单位：University of Auckland; Monash University; Australian National University
摘要：How prior trust moderates investor responses to restatements is unknown. We examine how societal trust affects the changes in institutional investors' shareholdings around a restatement. We consider two competing hypotheses based on the erosion of trust and confirmatory bias. We find the change in institutional investors' shareholdings around a restatement is more negative for investors from high trust areas compared to low trust areas, consistent with an erosion of trust where high trust inst...
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作者：Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Webb, R. Alan; Williamson, Michael G.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Waterloo; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Toward the goal of reconciling conflicting arguments on whether performance -based incentives facilitate or impede divergent thinking, we identify a feature common to prior demonstrations of negative incentive effects: they generally involve tasks with only one correct solution. Our first experiment replicates a negative incentive effect when insight problems require bottom -up divergent thinking from an unexpected resource to the problem it is uniquely equipped to solve, whereas our second ex...
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作者：Zhang, Gaoqing; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial -stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank's early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank's expos...
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作者：Pawliczek, Andrea; Skinner, A. Nicole; Zechman, Sarah L. C.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or blank check companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why invest...
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作者：Cadman, Brian D.; Campbell, John L.; Johnson, Ryan G.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：Boards of directors encourage risk -averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk -taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk -taking but find that this relation only holds when market -wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk -taking but find that th...
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作者：Schafhautle, Sandra G.; Veenman, David
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This study examines whether crowdsourced forecasts of earnings and revenues help investors unravel bias in earnings announcement news, which is commonly derived from analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that investors, on average, understand and price the predictive signals reflected in crowdsourced forecasts about the bias in analyst -based earnings and revenue surprises. Using the staggered addition of firms to the Estimize platform, we find that crowdsourced coverage is associated with re...
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作者：Kramer, Stephan; Mate, Michal
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Although it is well understood that product market competition acts as a disciplining mechanism that reduces inefficiencies, our understanding of the implications for firms' incentive design choices is still limited. We use a comprehensive new measure of competition and examine its effect on four major choices: CEO equity portfolio incentives, annual bonus plan incentives, choice of performance measures, and difficulty of financial performance targets. We find that competition reduces firm pro...
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作者：He, Jiapeng; Li, Kevin; Li, Ningzhong; Zhang, Weining
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Santa Clara University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for c...
