Optimal Reporting Systems in Bank Runs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Gaoqing; Zheng, Ronghuo
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2021-0626
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 457-481
• 关键词: Coordination games; global games; INFORMATION; RISK; TRANSPARENCY; conservatism

摘要

We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial -stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank's early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank's exposure to bank -run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank -run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy -making and empirical research.