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作者：Frankel, Richard; Seethamraju, Chandra; Zach, Tzachi
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study the role of goodwill in promoting contracting efficiency and the effect of SFAS 141 and 142 on this role. We provide three main results. First, when a lending agreement contains some type of minimum net-worth covenant, the probability of a tangible net-worth covenant is decreasing in the borrower's goodwill. Second, the use of tangible net-worth covenants has increased since the promulgation of SFAS 141 and 142. Finally, covenant slack is not significantly related to the use of tangib...
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作者：Geiger, Marshall A.; Lennox, Clive S.; North, David S.
作者单位：University of Richmond; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This study investigates the market's reaction to companies hiring accounting and finance officers directly from their external audit firms-the auditor-to-client hiring practice referred to as the revolving door. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) eliminated this hiring practice, reflecting concerns that such appointments may impair audit and financial reporting quality. However, it was also argued that companies may have benefited from hiring individuals already familiar with their systems, organiza...
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作者：Levi, Shai
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This study investigates firms' decisions to disclose accruals information in earnings press releases versus to provide it only in 10-Q filings and the impact of this disclosure on the pricing of accruals. I find that firms disclose accruals in their press releases when earnings alone are a weak indication of cash flow performance and that following these disclosures the accruals information is fully impounded into stock prices. The evidence suggests that when investor demand for accruals is li...
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作者：Arya, Anil; Glover, Jonathan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent's incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is in...
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作者：Hammersley, Jacqueline S.; Myers, Linda A.; Shakespeare, Catherine
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We examine the stock price reaction to management's disclosure of internal control weaknesses under 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to the characteristics of these weaknesses, controlling for other material announcements in the event window. We find that some characteristics of the weaknesses-their severity, management's conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the controls, their auditability, and the vagueness of the disclosures-are informative. We also find that the information content o...
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作者：Louis, Henock; Robinson, Dahlia; Sbaraglia, Andrew
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We find no evidence of accrual mispricing for firms that disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. For these firms, the market differentiates the discretionary from the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise. In contrast, the market fails to distinguish between the discretionary and the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise for firms that do not disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. These firms experience some stock price correction ...
