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作者:Ball, Ray; Robin, Ashok; Sadka, Gil
作者单位:Columbia University; University of Chicago; Rochester Institute of Technology
摘要:We hypothesize debt markets-not equity markets-are the primary influence on association metrics studied since Ball and Brown (1968 J Account Res 6:159-178). Debt markets demand high scores on timeliness, conservatism and Lev's (1989 J Account Res 27(supplement):153-192) R-2, because debt covenants utilize reported numbers. Equity markets do not rate financial reporting consistently with these metrics, because (among other things) they control for the total information incorporated in prices. S...
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作者:Lehavy, Reuven; Sloan, Richard G.
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Barclays
摘要:It is well established that investment fundamentals, such as earnings and cash flows, can explain only a small proportion of the variation in stock returns. We find that investor recognition of a firm's stock can explain relatively more of the variation in stock returns. Consistent with Merton's (I Finance 42(3):483-510, 1987) theoretical analysis, we show that (i) contemporaneous stock returns are positively related to changes in investor recognition, (ii) future stock returns are negatively ...
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作者:Aboody, David; Kasznik, Ron
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要:We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers' payout choices with shareholders' tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders' preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income...
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作者:Frankel, Richard; Seethamraju, Chandra; Zach, Tzachi
作者单位:Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要:We study the role of goodwill in promoting contracting efficiency and the effect of SFAS 141 and 142 on this role. We provide three main results. First, when a lending agreement contains some type of minimum net-worth covenant, the probability of a tangible net-worth covenant is decreasing in the borrower's goodwill. Second, the use of tangible net-worth covenants has increased since the promulgation of SFAS 141 and 142. Finally, covenant slack is not significantly related to the use of tangib...
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作者:Geiger, Marshall A.; Lennox, Clive S.; North, David S.
作者单位:University of Richmond; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要:This study investigates the market's reaction to companies hiring accounting and finance officers directly from their external audit firms-the auditor-to-client hiring practice referred to as the revolving door. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) eliminated this hiring practice, reflecting concerns that such appointments may impair audit and financial reporting quality. However, it was also argued that companies may have benefited from hiring individuals already familiar with their systems, organiza...
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作者:Levi, Shai
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:This study investigates firms' decisions to disclose accruals information in earnings press releases versus to provide it only in 10-Q filings and the impact of this disclosure on the pricing of accruals. I find that firms disclose accruals in their press releases when earnings alone are a weak indication of cash flow performance and that following these disclosures the accruals information is fully impounded into stock prices. The evidence suggests that when investor demand for accruals is li...
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作者:Arya, Anil; Glover, Jonathan
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent's incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is in...
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作者:Aboody, David; Hughes, John; Liu, Jing; Su, Wei
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:In this study, we investigate the extent to which exercise of executive stock options is based upon private information. Contrary to popular belief, we find that shares are held more than 30 days following over a quarter of options exercised. Partitioning the data, we find weak evidence that decisions to exercise and sell immediately are prompted by bad news and stronger evidence that decisions to exercise and hold for at least 30 days are prompted by good news. Enhancing the power of our test...
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作者:Ghicas, Dimitrios C.; Papadaki, Afroditi; Siougle, Georgia; Sougiannis, Theodore
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Athens University of Economics & Business
摘要:How useful are audit qualifications to financial statement users? We analyze a sample of 204 firms that went public at the Athens Stock Exchange over the period 1987-2002. For 149 of these firms, auditors report quantitative estimates of the amount by which assets are overstated and/or liabilities are understated in reported financial statements. We find that underwriters and their affiliated analysts do not incorporate the negative information provided by these qualifications into offer price...
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作者:Hammersley, Jacqueline S.; Myers, Linda A.; Shakespeare, Catherine
作者单位:Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:We examine the stock price reaction to management's disclosure of internal control weaknesses under 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to the characteristics of these weaknesses, controlling for other material announcements in the event window. We find that some characteristics of the weaknesses-their severity, management's conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the controls, their auditability, and the vagueness of the disclosures-are informative. We also find that the information content o...