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作者：Bol, Jasmijn C.; Leiby, Justin
作者单位：Tulane University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Although decision-making within firms improves when agents share information with one another, agents often have limited motivation to share because doing so takes effort and time. In four experiments, we examine how agents' responses to information sharing controls depend on an important source of motivation: active status motives, that is, the desire to gain respect from others. In a rewards-based system that compensates agents for sharing, agents with active status motives demand relatively...
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作者：Ertan, Aytekin; Karolyi, Stephen A.; Kelly, Peter W.; Stoumbos, Robert
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Notre Dame; Columbia University
摘要：We propose that extrapolative beliefs about earnings announcement (EA) returns may contribute to the understanding of EA return patterns. We construct a theoretically motivated measure of extrapolative investors' expectations based on a stock's recent history of EA returns. We then show that this measure explains cross-sectional variation in stock returns and investor behavior around EAs. Stocks expected to have high EA returns, according to our measure, experience predictable increases in pri...
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作者：Al-Hadi, Ahmed; Taylor, Grantley; Richardson, Grant
作者单位：Curtin University; Macquarie University
摘要：We examine whether state-level corruption and corporate tax avoidance in the United States (U.S) are related. Using a sample of 36,078 U.S. firm-year observations from 1998 to 2014, we find that corruption is significantly positively related to tax avoidance. Our main finding is consistent across a series of robustness tests. In additional analysis at the state level, we observe that corruption is significantly positively related to corporate tax avoidance in states that have low levels of lit...
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作者：Curtis, Quinn D.; Hopkins, Justin J.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Virginia
摘要：We examine whether revealing misreporting affects the careers of executives and independent directors. To isolate the effects of revealing misreporting from the underlying malfeasance, we analyze executives and directors who joined firms after stock option backdating ceased, but who were in place to determine how the firm would respond to the unfolding backdating crisis. Overall, these new executives and directors faced career penalties at firms that issued a backdating restatement relative to...
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作者：Anantharaman, Divya; Gao, Feng; Manchiraju, Hariom
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：Pension freezes are highly visible corporate actions with the potential to hurt the firms' reputation as responsible employers. We document that firms sponsoring defined-benefit pensions step up CSR engagement following announcements of defined-benefit pension freezes. Freeze firms also increase their usage of CSR-related keywords in public disclosures following the freeze. We find a stronger CSR response to more severe freezes, to more controversial cash-balance conversions, and in larger spo...
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作者：Ertan, Aytekin; Karolyi, Stephen A.; Kelly, Peter W.; Stoumbos, Robert
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Notre Dame; Columbia University
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作者：Cohen, Daniel; Li, Bin; Li, Ningzhong; Lou, Yun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Singapore Management University
摘要：We examine the relation between the presence of U.S. government as a major customer and a supplier firm's loan contract terms, using major corporate customers as a benchmark. We find that firms with major government customers are associated with fewer covenants and a lower likelihood of having performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts. In contrast, we do not find such associations for firms with major corporate customers. Further, we find no evidence that the existence of major go...
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作者：Na, Ke; Yan, Wenjia
作者单位：Nanjing University
摘要：This paper examines the effect of languages on corporate tax avoidance. We hypothesize and find that managers of firms in countries with languages that grammatically distinguish the future from the present (languages with a strong future time reference or FTR) perceive the potential future tax repayments and penalties to be more distant and therefore engage in more tax avoidance. Further tests exploiting the variation in language FTR within Switzerland and Belgium, which have different officia...
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作者：Ranasinghe, Tharindra; Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru; Yi, Lin
作者单位：American University; Rice University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Houston Clear Lake
摘要：Studies suggest that, pursuant to the implementation of SFAS 133, even sophisticated users of financial statements find it difficult to comprehend earnings implications of hedging derivatives. Moreover, due to stringent hedge accounting requirements under these standards, many economic hedges do not qualify for hedge accounting and are deemed ineffective for financial reporting purposes. Motivated by these considerations, we investigate the impact of hedging on earnings predictability by analy...
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作者：Ham, Charles G.; Kaplan, Zachary R.; Lemayian, Zawadi R.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Charles River Associates
摘要：We show analysts' own earnings forecasts predict error in their own forecasts of earnings at other horizons, which we argue provides a measure of the extent to which analysts inefficiently use information. We construct our measure by exploiting two sources of variation in analysts' incentives: (i) more recent forecasts have greater salience at the time of the earnings release so accuracy incentives are higher (lower) at shorter (longer) forecast horizons and (ii) analysts have greater incentiv...
