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作者：Ertimur, Yonca; Ferri, Fabrizio; Oesch, David
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University; University of St Gallen
摘要：We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory say on pay votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a one-size-fits-all approach. PAs' recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the instit...
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作者：Grabner, Isabella; Moers, Frank
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：In this study, we investigate the choice of performance measures in promotion decisions. In particular, we examine the extent to which managers incorporate different performance measures for different types of job assignment. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we predict that, in making promotion decisions, the weight on current job performance decreases with increases in the change in tasks upon promotion, while the weight on subjective assessments of ability increases. This result basi...
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作者：Choi, Jongwoon (Willie); Hecht, Gary W.; Tayler, William B.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Brigham Young University
摘要：Strategic performance measurement systems operationalize firm strategy with a set of performance measures. A consequence of such alignment is the tendency for managers to lose sight of the strategic construct(s) the measures are intended to represent, and subsequently act as though the measures are the constructs of interest, a phenomenon referred to as surrogation. We investigate how involvement in strategy selection affects managers propensity to exhibit surrogation. We predict and find that...
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作者：Daske, Holger; Hail, Luzi; Leuz, Christian; Verdi, Rodrigo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these...
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作者：Granja, Joao
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participa...
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作者：Robinson, Leslie A.; Stocken, Phillip C.
摘要：Using U.S.-based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate decision rights in response to their evolving environments. We find that a mismatch between the location of decision rights and a firm's environment is associated with weak firm performance. We also sho...
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作者：Bonsall, Samuel B.; Bozanic, Zahn; Fischer, Paul E.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm-specific components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms, which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of variation in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when bundled with earnings announcement...
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作者：Li, Feng; Lundholm, Russell; Minnis, Michael
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of British Columbia; University of Chicago
摘要：In this paper we develop a measure of competition based on management's disclosures in their 10-K filing and find that firms' rates of diminishing marginal returns on new and existing investment vary significantly with our measure. We show that these firm-level disclosures are related to existing industry-level measures of disclosure (e. g., Herfindahl index), but capture something distinctly new. In particular, we show that the measure has both across-industry variation and within-industry va...
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作者：Ahmed, Anwer S.; Duellman, Scott
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Saint Louis University
摘要：Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that exte...
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作者：Armstrong, Christopher S.; Gow, Ian D.; Larcker, David F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要：This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation...
