Strategy Selection, Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Jongwoon (Willie); Hecht, Gary W.; Tayler, William B.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Brigham Young University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00465.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 105-133
• 关键词: management control-systems; balanced scorecard; PARTICIPATION; INFORMATION; DELEGATION; antecedents; empowerment; judgments; DESIGN; RISK

摘要

Strategic performance measurement systems operationalize firm strategy with a set of performance measures. A consequence of such alignment is the tendency for managers to lose sight of the strategic construct(s) the measures are intended to represent, and subsequently act as though the measures are the constructs of interest, a phenomenon referred to as surrogation. We investigate how involvement in strategy selection affects managers propensity to exhibit surrogation. We predict and find that strategy selection reduces surrogation. Surprisingly, we do not find that engaging in strategy deliberation, a key process underlying strategy selection, reduces surrogation. Thus, managers involvement in the actual choice of strategy appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition to mitigate surrogation. Our paper broadens understanding of factors that influence surrogation, such as the effects of different aspects of managers strategic involvement and buy-in. Further, by documenting how managers behave within (as opposed to simply with) strategic performance measurement systems, we highlight the potential for managers to endogenously influence the effectiveness of such systems.