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作者：Ertimur, Yonca; Ferri, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Miami
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作者：Kothari, S. P.; Wasley, Charles
作者单位：U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Rochester
摘要：We commemorate the 50th anniversary of Ball and Brown [1968] by chronicling its impact on capital market research in accounting. We trace the evolution of various research paths that post-Ball and Brown [1968] researchers took as they sought to build on the foundation laid by Ball and Brown [1968] to create a body of research on the usefulness, timeliness, and other properties of accounting numbers. We discuss how those paths often link back to the groundwork laid and questions originally pose...
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作者：Corona, Carlos; Nan, Lin; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk-taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress-test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk-taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene ...
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作者：Banker, Rajiv D.; Darrough, Masako; Li, Shaopeng; Threinen, Lucas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Macalester College
摘要：We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately dec...
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作者：Cascino, Stefano; Correia, Maria; Tamayo, Ane
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation in reward crowdfunding. Using data from Kickstarter, the largest online reward crowdfunding platform, we show that, even in the absence of clear regulation and enforcement mechanisms, disclosure helps entrepreneurs access capital for their projects and bolsters engagement with potential project backers, consistent with the notion that disclosure mitigates moral hazard. We further document that, subsequent to a ch...
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作者：Choudhary, Preeti; Merkley, Kenneth; Schipper, Katherine
作者单位：University of Arizona; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Duke University
摘要：We analyze data made available through the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) to provide descriptive evidence on the properties of auditors' actual quantitative materiality judgments and the implications of those judgments for financial reporting. Auditors' quantitative materiality judgments do not appear to result simply from applying conventional rules of thumb (e.g., 5% of pretax income), but instead are associated with size-related financial statement outcomes (income, reven...
