Does Consumer Protection Enhance Disclosure Credibility in Reward Crowdfunding?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cascino, Stefano; Correia, Maria; Tamayo, Ane
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12289
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1247-1302
• 关键词: Information asymmetry; Textual analysis; READABILITY; uncertainty; ECONOMICS; finance; MARKET; news

摘要

We study how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation in reward crowdfunding. Using data from Kickstarter, the largest online reward crowdfunding platform, we show that, even in the absence of clear regulation and enforcement mechanisms, disclosure helps entrepreneurs access capital for their projects and bolsters engagement with potential project backers, consistent with the notion that disclosure mitigates moral hazard. We further document that, subsequent to a change in Kickstarter's terms of use that increases the threat of consumer litigation, the association between project funding and disclosure becomes stronger. This evidence suggests that consumer protection regulation enhances the perceived credibility of disclosure. We find the effect of the change in terms of use to be more pronounced in states with stricter consumer protection regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the role of disclosure, as well as on the potential effects of increased regulation on crowdfunding platforms.